Development updates

Security incident of November 9, 2026: bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2

On November 9, 2026, an attacker published two malicious releases through Swarm Foundation's official release channels: version 13.3.0 of the JavaScript library @ethersphere/bee-js on npm, and version 0.56.2 of Swarm Desktop on GitHub. Neither was made by Swarm Foundation.

On November 9, 2026, an attacker published two malicious releases through Swarm Foundation's official release channels: version 13.3.0 of the JavaScript library @ethersphere/bee-js on npm, and version 0.56.2 of Swarm Desktop on GitHub. Neither was made by Swarm Foundation. This post explains what the releases did, who may be affected, how to check and what has changed.

If you only read one paragraph: if you ran Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, or installed bee-js 13.3.0, treat that computer and the Swarm node key on it as compromised. The steps are in the section "If you are affected". The version shown today is not a reliable check: Swarm Desktop offers each update and installs it after one click, so a machine that ran 0.56.2 may show the clean 0.56.3 now.

The two releases

Release Published (UTC, November 9) Removed Safe version
@ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 on npm 00:09 approx. 01:25 13.2.0
Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 on GitHub 00:36 approx. 09:21 0.56.3

Both releases contained a small loader. When the library was installed, or when the Desktop app started, the loader downloaded further code from a server controlled by the attacker and ran it. The code was not in the release itself, so the attacker could change what it did at any time.

The downloaded code would do two things on Linux, macOS and Windows:

  • Copy the Swarm Desktop node key and its password. Together these give control of the node's wallet: its xDAI and xBZZ, the chequebook balance and any stake.
  • Install a hidden remote-access program that starts with the computer. Such a program lets the attacker read files, record what is typed, and run commands as the user.

Swarm Desktop 0.56.3, published at 12:52 UTC the same day, is the same code as 0.56.1, signed with a new certificate. It replaces the malicious release. It does not undo anything the downloaded code already did.

How the attack worked

The attacker had obtained the credentials of a project maintainer and the token of the automated account that publishes the releases. With those two, the release pipeline would build, sign and publish without a second person approving. Every release now requires a human approval in a protected release environment; see "What has changed".

The malicious code is not new. Security researchers at Socket and Pluto Security tied it to an operation that has been placing fake Solidity developer tools in extension marketplaces since 2025. Its targets are developers and operators who hold Ethereum wallets. This time the operator used a real project's release channel instead of a fake extension.

Who may be affected

Swarm Desktop users. Anyone whose Swarm Desktop was running on macOS or Windows between 00:36 and about 09:21 UTC on November 9, or who downloaded the installer in that window on any system. On macOS and Windows, Desktop downloads each new version and installs it when the user confirms, so a running app would have offered 0.56.2, run it once confirmed, and later offered 0.56.3 the same way. Any build of 0.56.2 obtained through any other channel is affected as well, including packages built by third parties from the 0.56.2 source. One known case: the community Arch Linux package swarm-desktop built 0.56.2 from the malicious source between 03:35 UTC on November 9 and 03:10 UTC on November 10, so anyone who installed version 0.56.2-1 from the Arch User Repository (AUR) in that window is affected. Intel Mac users who relied on the official download are not affected, because no Intel Mac build of 0.56.2 was published.

Developers. Anyone who ran npm install for a project depending on bee-js between 00:09 and about 01:25 UTC on November 9 without a lockfile pinning an older version. Projects that commit a lockfile did not receive 13.3.0; the known dependent projects were checked.

No tampering was found in any other Swarm package, release or image. Every recent release, npm version and container image published by the project was reviewed, and the stable JavaScript releases were rebuilt from their source; they match what the registries serve, byte for byte.

It is not known how many people ran 0.56.2 or installed 13.3.0. As of this writing, no node wallets are known to have been emptied. If you ran either release, follow the steps in "If you are affected" even if your wallet looks untouched.

How to check

Swarm Desktop writes its version to a log file each time it starts. Search those files for the text Bee Desktop version: 0.56.2. Do not start Swarm Desktop to look.

  • macOS: the folder ~/Library/Logs/Swarm Desktop, files bee-desktop*.log.
  • Windows: the folder %LOCALAPPDATA%\Swarm Desktop\Log, files bee-desktop*.log. A folder named app-0.56.2 under %LOCALAPPDATA%\swarm-desktop also means it was installed.
  • Linux: the folder ~/.local/state/Swarm Desktop, files bee-desktop*.log.

Check all the log files, not only the newest; older ones are kept with a number in the name.

A second sign on any system: a hidden folder named .solidity in your home folder, a startup item named solidity-langsupport-runner (Linux) or com.solidity.langsupport.runner (macOS), or an unfamiliar remote-support program installed on November 9 (Windows).

Developers: run npm ls @ethersphere/bee-js in each project. If it shows 13.3.0, you are affected. npm audit also reports it, because a security advisory exists for that version.

If none of these are present, no sign of the malicious code was found on that computer. Update to 0.56.3 and bee-js 13.2.0 or later when convenient.

If you are affected

Treat everything on that computer as exposed, not only the node key. There is no way to tell from the outside what the attacker took from any one machine. First disconnect the computer from the internet: the remote-access program keeps working, and the attacker keeps access, for as long as it is online. Then do these in order, from a different, clean device:

  1. Move the node funds. Move all xDAI and xBZZ, the chequebook balance and any withdrawable stake from the node wallet to a new wallet.
  2. Rotate everything else. Other crypto wallets whose files or seed phrases were on that computer (move the funds), browser-saved passwords, email, exchange accounts, SSH keys, API tokens, the password-manager master password. Sign out of all sessions everywhere.
  3. Clean the computer. Back up personal files, reinstall the operating system, then install Swarm Desktop 0.56.3 fresh so it creates a new node key. Removing the files named above is not enough to be sure; the remote-access program could have installed anything else afterwards.
  4. Never reuse the old node key or a backup of it, and do not restore the Swarm Desktop data folder from before November 9.

What has changed

  • The credentials used to publish the malicious releases were revoked and replaced, including the certificate that signs Swarm Desktop.
  • Publishing a release or signing an installer now requires a human approval in a protected release environment, in addition to the automated build, in every repository that publishes. A stolen token alone can no longer publish.
  • Long-lived publishing tokens were removed in favor of trusted publishing, where npm verifies the build came from the repository's own workflow (the OpenID Connect method).
  • Release tags can no longer be deleted or moved once pushed, in any repository.
  • Repository administrators can no longer bypass review or required checks on the main branches.
  • Repository security advisories were published for both malicious versions, so dependency scanners flag them: GHSA-9f32-98m9-4jx3 for bee-js and GHSA-cvj7-ww9m-p9p6 for Swarm Desktop.

Thanks

StepSecurity reported the malicious npm package within an hour of its publication. Bitbison, SafeDep, Socket and Pluto Security published analyses that informed this post, and a community researcher first reported the Desktop release. Swarm Foundation is grateful to all of them.

Indicators of compromise

For operators of security tooling. Presence of any of these means the downloaded code ran.

  • Outbound connections to api.frameworkmetrics.xyz
  • Directory ~/.solidity/
  • Linux: user service solidity-langsupport-runner
  • macOS: launch agent com.solidity.langsupport.runner
  • Windows: an unexpected ScreenConnect remote-support client installed on November 9, 2026
  • Installed packages: @ethersphere/bee-js@13.3.0; Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 (log line Bee Desktop version: 0.56.2)