On November 9, 2026, an attacker published two malicious releases through Swarm Foundation's official release channels: version 13.3.0 of the JavaScript library @ethersphere/bee-js on npm, and version 0.56.2 of Swarm Desktop on GitHub.
Neither was made by Swarm Foundation.
This post explains what the releases did, who may be affected, how to check and what has changed.
If you only read one paragraph: if you ran Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, or installed bee-js 13.3.0, treat that computer and the Swarm node key on it as compromised. The steps are in the section "If you are affected". The version shown today is not a reliable check: Swarm Desktop offers each update and installs it after one click, so a machine that ran 0.56.2 may show the clean 0.56.3 now.
The two releases
| Release | Published (UTC, November 9) | Removed | Safe version |
|---|---|---|---|
@ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 on npm |
00:09 | approx. 01:25 | 13.2.0 |
| Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 on GitHub | 00:36 | approx. 09:21 | 0.56.3 |
Both releases contained a small loader. When the library was installed, or when the Desktop app started, the loader downloaded further code from a server controlled by the attacker and ran it. The code was not in the release itself, so the attacker could change what it did at any time.
The downloaded code would do two things on Linux, macOS and Windows:
- Copy the Swarm Desktop node key and its password. Together these give control of the node's wallet: its xDAI and xBZZ, the chequebook balance and any stake.
- Install a hidden remote-access program that starts with the computer. Such a program lets the attacker read files, record what is typed, and run commands as the user.
Swarm Desktop 0.56.3, published at 12:52 UTC the same day, is the same code as 0.56.1, signed with a new certificate. It replaces the malicious release. It does not undo anything the downloaded code already did.
How the attack worked
The attacker had obtained the credentials of a project maintainer and the token of the automated account that publishes the releases. With those two, the release pipeline would build, sign and publish without a second person approving. Every release now requires a human approval in a protected release environment; see "What has changed".
The malicious code is not new. Security researchers at Socket and Pluto Security tied it to an operation that has been placing fake Solidity developer tools in extension marketplaces since 2025. Its targets are developers and operators who hold Ethereum wallets. This time the operator used a real project's release channel instead of a fake extension.
Who may be affected
Swarm Desktop users. Anyone whose Swarm Desktop was running on macOS or Windows between 00:36 and about 09:21 UTC on November 9, or who downloaded the installer in that window on any system.
On macOS and Windows, Desktop downloads each new version and installs it when the user confirms, so a running app would have offered 0.56.2, run it once confirmed, and later offered 0.56.3 the same way.
Any build of 0.56.2 obtained through any other channel is affected as well, including packages built by third parties from the 0.56.2 source.
One known case: the community Arch Linux package swarm-desktop built 0.56.2 from the malicious source between 03:35 UTC on November 9 and 03:10 UTC on November 10, so anyone who installed version 0.56.2-1 from the Arch User Repository (AUR) in that window is affected.
Intel Mac users who relied on the official download are not affected, because no Intel Mac build of 0.56.2 was published.
Developers. Anyone who ran npm install for a project depending on bee-js between 00:09 and
about 01:25 UTC on November 9 without a lockfile pinning an older version. Projects that commit
a lockfile did not receive 13.3.0; the known dependent projects were checked.
No tampering was found in any other Swarm package, release or image. Every recent release, npm version and container image published by the project was reviewed, and the stable JavaScript releases were rebuilt from their source; they match what the registries serve, byte for byte.
It is not known how many people ran 0.56.2 or installed 13.3.0. As of this writing, no node wallets are known to have been emptied. If you ran either release, follow the steps in "If you are affected" even if your wallet looks untouched.